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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (61) 32ND MEETING HELD ON
TUESDAY, 30TH MAY, 1961

2. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 21st Meeting, Minute 1)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute¹ by the Secretary circulating a draft memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office, covering all aspects of Berlin Contingency planning. A further minute² by the Secretary and a note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff³ were relevant to their discussion.

A. Memorandum by the Foreign Office

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the paper by the Foreign Office had been prepared on the instructions of Ministers⁴ in preparation for a review of the whole field of contingency planning which was to be undertaken with the Americans. He believed that the paper, which had since been approved by the Foreign Secretary, reflected the Committee's views on Berlin Contingency Planning generally. In particular it clearly stated the Committee's aversion to plans designed to re-open autobahn access and gave, as they did, preference to airlift plans. There was one aspect which, he believed, should be included in the paper. This was the increased danger of war breaking out by miscalculation since both the Americans and the Russians believed that the other would not resort to global war over Berlin. It was precisely in those circumstances that a war was most likely to begin. He believed the Committee would wish to endorse the Foreign Office paper subject to the inclusion of this point and it would thereafter be put to Ministers for use as a brief for the discussions between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States, due to take place on Monday, 5th June, 1961.

¹ COS.648/26/5/61

² COS.658/29/5/61

³ CIGS/PP/121

⁴ D(61)7th Meeting, Minute 3

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THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Agreed with the views of the Chief of the Defence Staff.
- (2) Took note that the Foreign Office would highlight the point at (1) above in the final version of their memorandum.
- (3) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would inform the Minister of Defence of their views.

B. Note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that ground access plans had recently been discussed by Ministers who held the same views as those expressed in the Note before them. He suggested that the Committee should do no more than take note of the C.I.G.S.'s views pending the outcome of the United Kingdom discussions with the Americans.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (4) Took note of the Note by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
£ CIGS/PP/121

C. Visit by Sir Frank Roberts

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the Committee would have seen the telegram from H.M. Ambassador to Moscow on the possible action the Russians might take over Berlin. Sir Frank Roberts would be in the United Kingdom in June and it might be advisable to invite him to attend their meeting on Tuesday, 20th June, 1961, when they could discuss the question with him.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (5) Invited the Ministry of Defence to arrange for an invitation to be sent to Sir Frank Roberts.
• Moscow to Foreign Office No.997.

D. State of LIVE OAK Planning

COLONEL R.J. CHAUNDLER (Chief of the United Kingdom Delegation to LIVE OAK) said that there were four matters of which the Committee should be aware. First, the French team had recently stated that their Government was unable to provide any forces for the divisional size operation. He had that day been informed that General Norstad was considering issuing an instruction to the Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine, to continue planning for this operation based on a US/UK force. Secondly, General Norstad had told LIVE OAK to prepare an instruction to GINCBAR to carry-out live training of the TRADE WIND (battalion group) force as soon as possible. Thirdly, LIVE OAK had been studying the type of organisation that would be required to implement any of the military contingency plans. The American and French delegations were of the opinion that the LIVE OAK Group with a small increase, notably that of a British Major-General, would be the best

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instrument for this purpose and it was proposed to inform General Norstad accordingly. Lastly, the French team had prepared a study on the need to co-ordinate all plans for Berlin, including those sponsored by LIVE OAK, Berlin Defence Plans, and Allied Command Europe Emergency Defence Plans. The French proposal was that all these plans should be co-ordinated by the LIVE OAK Group.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) General Norstad had so far only been authorised to make a plan for the composition, assembly and logistic support of a divisional size operation on a tripartite basis; no governmental authority existed for such a plan to be made on a US/UK basis. In view of the recent telegram sent to C-in-C BAOR, he would no doubt seek guidance from the Committee on receipt of these new instructions.
- (b) C-in-C BAOR had been instructed, following Ministers' recent discussions, not to carry out training of the TRADE WIND forces, but to refer any new orders on this matter to the Committee. An awkward situation would arise if General Norstad pursued his intention of ordering such training for he had been previously informed of Her Majesty's Government's consent to it.
- (c) Whilst the Committee would consider any requests by General Norstad for an increase in the LIVE OAK staff for the implementation of Berlin Contingency plans, it might be preferable if the necessary action were taken through the normal NATO chain of command. A decision on this matter - which was not required immediately - would depend on the outcome of the next round of US/UK talks on Berlin Contingency Planning as a whole.
- (d) The French study recommending the co-ordination of LIVE OAK plans with SACEM's Emergency Defence Plans would emphasise the need for NATO as a whole to be brought in to Berlin Contingency Planning. Our representative in LIVE OAK should accordingly encourage the French to launch their study officially.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (6) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would inform the Minister of Defence of these developments in LIVE OAK.
- (7) Instructed Colonel Chaundler to take note of their views.

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30TH MAY, 1961.

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